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LIST VOTING’S TRAVELS: THE IMPORTANCE
OF BEING INDEPENDENT IN THE BOARDROOM
Maria Lucia Passador*
ABSTRACT
The life of the law, especially with regard to corporations, is strongly
influenced by experience and practice. The board, a living element of
corporate law, is therefore one of the most noteworthy aspects to be
studied, given its relevant implications and role as the lifeblood of
scholarly debates.
This Article offers a novel contribution to the assessment of list
voting, a fairly unique Italian system that has been increasingly
appreciated by institutional investors. A hand-picked dataset that
stretches from 2005 to 2015 shows a positive correlation between
minority-appointed directors in the boardroom and dividend payouts.
Furthermore, the findings shed light on the practice of appointing
independent directors based on slates proposed by the minority of
shareholders and provide evidence that list voting works, not only in
closely-held corporations, but also on a global scale, despite the
previous scholarship that argues that list voting makes more sense in
concentrated ownership scenarios. Although the empirical analysis
focuses on the Italian case, the insight gained in this analysis regarding
the effectiveness of list voting is also useful for other jurisdictions.
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INTRODUCTION
“Board composition is the issue for investors in 2017.”1 This Article
addresses the crucial interests linked to a sound appointment process of
1. Paula Loop, A Look at Board Composition: How Does Your Industry Stack Up?,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 6, 2017) (emphasis added),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/06/a-look-at-board-composition-how-doesyour-industry-stack-up [https://perma.cc/7MK5-JV6V]. For overviews on board matters
and concerns, see Martin Lipton & Sabastian V. Niles, The Spotlight on Boards 2017,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 29, 2017),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/29/the-spotlight-on-boards-2017-2
[https://perma.cc/V2VF-SA3G]; Stephen F. Arcano & Thomas H. Kennedy, Directors
Must Navigate Challenges of Shareholder-Centric Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 22, 2017), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/22/
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key figures in corporate boards, with a special focus on independent
directors. These independent directors are predominantly devoted to the
supervision of a thoughtful long-term strategy and the needs of
institutional investors.2 This Article aims to enrich the existing literature
with an in-depth analysis of the list (or slate) voting mechanism, one of
the most well-known and appreciated peculiarities in the Italian corporate
law framework.3
As is often the case in the field of business law, an analysis of a
mechanism’s function plays a crucial role in the supporting legal
discussion. 4 This Article advances relevant literature by providing
evidence that independent directors selected from lists presented by
minority shareholders are quite effective in improving the governance of
listed corporations.
To demonstrate that list voting represents an effective instrument of
governance, this Article combines legal and empirical observations,
directors-must-navigate-challenges-of-shareholder-centric-paradigm [https://perma.cc/
5LUU-VXW4].
2. The average share capital possessed by institutional investors did not notably
differ from previous years (2013 & 2014), as stated in the latest report issued by the
Commissione Nazionale Per Le Società E La Borsa (CONSOB), which is an organization
akin to an “Italian SEC.” Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa, Report on
Corporate Governance of Italian Listed Companies, 3, 11-13 (2017) [hereinafter
CONSOB, Report on Corporate Governance].
3. List voting is a method in which shareholders of listed corporations reaching a
minimum threshold of shares, which is calculated based on the capitalization of the issuer
(often around 1.5%), present a “list” for the election of the board. Directors from the list
receiving the greatest number of votes are elected, but a minimum number of directors
(generally one) are taken from the list receiving the second highest number of votes,
ensuring greater representation of minority shareholders. Lists are presented by both
majority and minority shareholders (owning at least 2% of shares), but the terms
“majority list(s)” or “minority list(s)” are used as a result of the appointment process,
and not because of the fact that the lists are presented by majority or minority
shareholders. See generally Marco Ventoruzzo et al., Italian Boards and The Strange
Case of the Minority Becoming Majority, HARVARD L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. &
FIN. REG. (May 23, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/05/23/italian-boardsand-the-strange-case-of-the-minority-becoming-majority/ [https://perma.cc/3Z7U-XF
D2].
4. See id. at 4-5. The interpretations provided in this Article pertain exclusively to
listed companies, which are required to use list voting for the appointment of directors
and must be limited to them; however, all companies may use this method to ensure
effective protection of minority shareholders.
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arguing that Enhanced-Independence Directors (EI Directors) are truly
necessary. 5 From a methodological perspective, this Article offers a
preliminary and essential description of list voting, while also undertaking
a comparative assessment and evaluating the propensity of independent,
and minority-appointed, directors to pay dividends. 6 In light of the
literature, which suggests that independent directors are more concerned
with the board’s monitoring activity and that dividends in corporate
governance aim to mitigate the free cash flow issue, boards with a
significant number of minority-appointed directors are more likely to use
dividend payouts as a corporate governance tool.7
Part I of this Article examines list voting and its main issues. Part II
depicts the comparative scenario, providing the reader with an overview
of the alternatives worldwide, contemplating similarities and differences
that shareholders have at their disposal to appoint valuable directors. Part
III presents the empirical analysis performed to evaluate whether the
Italian list voting technique can succeed at an international level.

5. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling
Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1275, 1277 (2017). See generally Giovanni
Strampelli, How to Enhance Directors’ Independence at Controlled Companies, J. CORP.
LAW (forthcoming) (discussing regulatory strategies that can be used to mitigate the
distorting effects of the relational dimension of the board and to induce EI directors to
undertake their supervisory functions in an independent way despite the presence of a
controlling shareholder).
6. Brian R. Cheffins, Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: The Separation
of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273, 130608 (2006).
7. “[T]he main role for such boards is to mediate between shareholders with
conflicting preferences for dividends” and to “reconcile fundamental differences in
owners’ preferences and/or act as a referee when owners disagree on corporate policies,
most notably on the dividend policies.” Mike Burkart, Salvatore Miglietta & Charlotte
Ostergaard, Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law,
4, 6–7 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., Paper No. 504, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2902617 [https://perma.cc/U4NW2HP5].
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I. LIST VOTING IN ITALY
A. THE ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
The United States began using the term “independent directors” in
the 1970s.8 The primary function of independent directors in the United
States “has been clear: to monitor management on behalf of dispersed
shareholders, who are hindered by collective action problems from
monitoring management themselves.”9 Also, it is “uncontroversial” that
they “were not (and are not) primarily designed to be a mechanism for
monitoring controlling shareholders . . . becom[ing] functionally
redundant in companies with a controlling shareholder.”10 Such a concept
of “independence from managers” is not necessarily applicable
elsewhere, since, in many leading economies, independent directors are
designed to be “independent from the company’s management and
significant shareholders.”11
In 2011, the Italian Corporate Governance Code also introduced
independent directors.12 The Code did not limit their role to the subtler
8. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the U.S., 1950-2005:
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1477 (2007).
9. Dan W. Puchniak & Kon Sik Kim, Varieties of Independent Directors in Asia:
A Taxonomy, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL AND
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 89, 97 (Dan W. Puchniak, Harald Baum & Luke Nottage eds.,
2017).
10. Id. at 98.
11. Id. at 102; see also Robert M. Bowen, Shantanu Dutta, Songlian Tang &
Pengcheng Zhu, Inside the “Black Box” of Private In-House Meetings, 23 REV. ACCT.
STUD. 487 (2018) (emphasizing the association between the independence of the board
and (1) the frequency of meetings, which suggests better communication with major
external investors; (2) the promptness of public communications; and (3) the relatively
small market response to such meetings, conveying that more independent boards could
discourage managers from sharing price-sensitive information). A further association can
be found between the independence of the board and the reduction of insider trading and
its profitability in private meetings and, in general, among listed companies.
12. Codice di Autodisciplina [Corporate Governance Code] Luglio 2015, art. 2, Jul.
2015 (It.). See Lucia Calvosa, Alcune Riflessioni Sulla Figura Degli Amministratori
Indipendenti, in IL TESTO UNICO DELLA FINANZA. UN BILANCIO DOPO 15 ANNI 45, 45–56
(Filippo Annunziata ed. 2015) (It.); Maria Luisa Di Battista, Andrea Lippi & Paola
Schwizer, Independent Directors and Governance Ratings: Evidence from Italian Listed
Companies, in RESHAPING COMMERCIAL BANKING IN ITALY: NEW CHALLENGES FROM
LENDING TO GOVERNANCE 241 (2014); Francesco Chiappetta, Gli amministratori
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U.S. meaning, 13 rather it fully recognizes that independent directors
express the opinions, albeit subjective, of minority shareholders. Thus,
the Italian recognition of independent directors has contributed to a
constant and profitable dialogue, creating a correct, transparent, and
efficient governance.14
indipendenti e gli amministratori di minoranza, 4 RIV. DIR. SOC. 852, 857-58 (2009) (It.);
Paolo Ferro-Luzzi, Indipendente . . . Da Chi; Da Cosa?, RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ [RIV.
SOC.] 204 (2008) (It.); Francesco Denozza, L’ ‘Amministratore di Minoranza’ e i suoi
Critici, 31 GIURISPRUDENZA COMMERCIALE [GIUR. COMM.] 767, 767 (2005) (It.); María
Gutiérrez & Maribel Sáez, Deconstructing Independent Directors, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD.
63, 93 (2013) (“We think of the independents as a mechanism that would facilitate the
effective exercise of many of the ‘rights of the minority’ granted by corporate law that
are not enforced because of collective action problems. Therefore, they would use their
privileged information to act as surrogates for the minority in all the matters where the
role of the minority is already recognised by the law, such as information rights, voting
in cases of conflicts of interest and the bringing about of lawsuits against the board.”);
Andrea Pisani Massamormile, Appunti sugli Amministratori Indipendenti 2 RIVISTA DI
DIRITTO SOCIETARIO [RIV. DIR. SOC.] 237, 241-42 (2008) (It.); Duccio Regoli, Gli
Amministratori Indipendenti, in 2 IL NUOVO DIRITTO DELLE SOCIETÀ, LIBER AMICORUM
GIAN FRANCO CAMPOBASSO 385, 385-97 (P. Abbadessa & G.B. Portale eds., 2006) (It.);
Umberto Tombari, Amministratori Indipendenti, “Sistema dei Controlli” e Corporate
Governance: Quale Futuro?, 65 BANCA BORSA 506, 506-07 (2012) (It.). See generally
Massimo Belcredi & Lorenzo Caprio, Amministratori indipendenti e amministratori di
minoranza: stato dell’arte e proposte evolutive, in ATTI DEI SEMINARI CELEBRATIVI PER
I 40 ANNI DALL’ISTITUZIONE DELLA COMMISSIONE NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETÀ E LA
BORSA 19 (G. Mollo ed., 2015) (It.); Guido Ferrarini & Marilena Filippelli, Independent
Directors and Controlling Shareholders Around the World (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.
Working Paper Series in L., Paper No. 258, 2014) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2443786 [https://perma.cc/N5QY-VR53]; Guido Ferrarini, Funzione
del Consiglio di Amministrazione, Ruolo Degli Indipendenti e Doveri Fiduciari, in I
CONTROLLI SOCIETARI-MOLTE REGOLE, NESSUN SISTEMA 51 (Margherita Bianchini &
Carmine Di Noia eds., 2010) (It.); Umberto Tombari, Verso uno “Statuto Speciale” degli
Amministratori Indipendenti. (Prime Considerazioni sul d.lgs. n. 303/2006 e sulle
Modifiche al Regolamento Consob in Materia di Emittenti), 3 RIV. DIR. SOC. 51 (2007)
(It.).
13. Puchniak & Kim, supra note 9, at 97. (“[A] monolithic label obscures the reality
that jurisdictional differences in the form and function of ‘independent directors’ . . . may
be significant”).
14. Id. at 98-99. The two figures differ significantly in terms of function and
structure. While independent directors are needed in the boardroom, there is no rule
requiring the presence of minority-appointed directors, in particular if: (1) no slate of
candidates has been filed, and (2) the requirements contained in the bylaws or in the law
have not been met.
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It does not necessarily follow, however, that there is a clash between
directors with different ideologies,15 creating strong tension. In fact, list
voting sometimes promotes effective monitoring and highly critical
assessment of directors’ behavior.16
B. ROLE OF DIRECTORS APPOINTED BY MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN THE
BOARDROOM
It is clear that the free, unregulated, but nevertheless effective,
balance among corporate interests is not conducive to the protection of
minority shareholders. 17 Accordingly, the U.K. regulatory authority
required that the election or re-election of independent directors would
need a majority of both shareholders and independent shareholders of the
listed company.18 The Italian regulation introduced list voting,19 in which
the minority list can determine the election of at least one director (out of
seven, or at least two directors if more than seven directors are on the
15.
16.

Denozza, supra note 12, at 769.
Id. In large listed corporations, the role of the board is predominantly to monitor,
approve the overall corporate strategy, ensure that officers and managers effectively and
loyally pursue the best interest of investors, but do not manage day-to-day operation. Id.
Thus, directors representing shareholders (especially minority ones) strengthen their
monitoring function and critics related to managerial aspects.
17. Defining the concept of minority, a priori, is not easy. Only after voting, slates
may be identified as “minority lists” or not, which can lead to paradoxical results, as some
Italian cases may suggest. See Alberto Mazzoni, Le Minoranze nella Tipologia della
Realtà, in LA TUTELA DELLE MINORANZE NELLE SOCIETÀ QUOTATE. STUDI IN MEMORIA
DI ALESSANDRO CERRAI 13, 16 (Antonio Piras ed., 2004) (It.); C. Angelici, La tutela delle
minoranze, 18 SOCIETÀ 786, 787 (1999) (It.); Paolo Montalenti, Corporate Governance:
La Tutela delle Minoranze nella Riforma delle Società Quotate, 25 GIUR. COMM. 329
(1998) (It.); Niccolò Salanitro, La Tutela delle Minoranze nelle Assemblee delle Società
Quotate 62 BANCA BORSA 681, 682 (1999) (It.). See also Marco Ventoruzzo et al., Italian
Boards and the Strange Case of the Minority Becoming Majority, HARVARD L. SCH.
FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (May 23, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2016/05/23/italian-boards-and-the-strange-case-of-the-minority-becoming-majority/
[https://perma.cc/3Z7U-XFD2].
18. FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY HANDBOOK, § 9.2.2.E (R) (UK).
19. It should be noted that list voting first appeared in the context of non-listed
corporations as a political choice given the low access threshold required to present such
minority lists. Already recognized a decade ago, the system is now increasingly relevant
since the number of institutional investors is rapidly growing. See Codice civile [C.C.]
[Civil Code] art. 2368 (It.); Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n.58 G.U. July 12,
2011 n.120 at art. 148 (It.).
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board)20 among the candidates not mentioned on the majority list.21 This
ensures a more balanced structure of the board, especially in cases of
concentrated ownership. But, even before that, the possibility of deviating
from the majority rule through list voting was derived from the Italian
Civil Code, which enables the bylaws to regulate the appointment of
directors.22
C. IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE APPOINTMENT OF
DIRECTORS: THE ITALIAN CASE
The problem of controlling the influx of private benefits is
remarkable, especially in Italy, a country characterized by a stable control
of the majority group, family ties, and shareholders’ agreements. The
provisions of the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance (TUF) must,
therefore, necessarily aim to balance minority rights against the almost
non-contestability of listed Italian issuers that hinder the creation of an
ideal market for corporate control.23 It is essential to make the company
attractive to foreign investors as well, since their presence leads to
economic and financial development. The perception of a wellfunctioning system is often deemed useful to encourage overall
investments. Therefore, the impression of efficiency becomes essential to
the final decisions of investors. In other words, appropriate governance
functions as a signal to institutional investors, which enhances confidence
20. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1292 (explaining that
“a recent amendment provided public investors with the power to reelect an external
director” even if there are any objections). For a comparison, see the following for Israel’s
approach. Companies Law, 5759-1999, § 239 (1999-2000) (Isr.); see also Itai
Fiegenbaum & Amir N. Licht, Corporate Law of Israel 7–8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.,
L. Working Paper Series No. 372, 2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3050329 [https://perma.cc/A9FM-RRSR] (requiring public companies to
have at least two external directors—not related to the controlling shareholder—on their
boards, elected for a term of three years, and possibly re-elected for two additional terms
of office of the same duration). Public investors have the right to veto the appointment of
such directors, but are not allowed to nominate them. See Assaf Hamdani & Yishay
Yafeh, Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders, 17 REV. FIN. 691, 701 (2013).
21. Mario Notari & Mario S. Richter Jr., Adeguamenti Statutari e Voto a Scrutinio
Segreto nella legge sul Risparmio, 5 SOCIETÀ 533, 533-34 (2006) (It.).
22. Codice civile [C.C.] [Civil Code] art. 2368 (It.).
23. D.Lgs. n.58 (1998) (It.). TUF is the fundamental law governing the financial
markets in Italy.
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in the valuation of investments, and consequently serves as a reference
for shareholders with few shares, while simultaneously attracting new
investors.24
List voting is an essential factor for shareholder activism, as well as
for financial and institutional partners and hedge funds.25 Assogestioni, a
voluntary non-profit association of asset management companies created
in 1984, promotes activist initiatives, including list voting, through means
such as assisting institutional investors complete certain administrative
procedures (e.g. the submission of lists and the selection of candidates).26
All this is not sufficient, however, to address the marked weakness of the
phenomenon that afflicts the geographical environment. Most asset
management companies are relatively inactive, as they have strong links
to funds, such as Azimut, Ersel, Fondaco Franklin Templeton
Investments, and Kairos Partners, each of which plays a key role when
they are independent. 27 Nonetheless, asset management companies’
activities are growing over time, 28 mainly as a result of the
implementation of the Shareholders’ Rights Directive (as amended in
2017, also known as SHRD II).
Foreign institutional investors, who prefer to sit on the sidelines, may
occasionally rely on the boards to submit the list(s), facilitating their
participation in the governance of the listed companies in which they
commit capital.

24. Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Constraints on Large-Block
Shareholders, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 139, 144-55 (Randall K.
Morck ed., 2000).
25. Although hedge funds are not particularly active in the Italian market, partially
due to the presence of concentrated shareholding and the strong role of family businesses,
their existence is confirmed by Algebris Investments in Assicurazioni Generali, Amber
in Banca Popolare di Milano, and Centaurus in Marzotto. See Matteo Erede, Governing
Corporations with Concentrated Ownership Structure: an Empirical Analysis of Hedge
Fund Activism in Italy and Germany, and its Evolution, 3 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV.
328, 363-66 (2013). In spite of the tools that the regulator offers them, and through the
appointment of directors, hedge funds did not gain any relevant role. Id. at 368-70.
26. Interview with Marcello Messori, Former President, Assogestioni, L’attivismo
dei Gestori e il Ruolo della Corporate Governance in Italia (2017), http://www.
assogestioni.it/index.cfm/3,147,5305/messori_governance_0609.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F35A-LE94].
27. Erede, supra note 25, at 383-88.
28. Id. at 375.
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D. LIST VOTING TECHNIQUE: THE ITALIAN CASE
List voting is consistent with the already existing requirements with
which directors must comply, influencing their ability to make up their
minds, as well as strengthening integrity, ethics, loyalty, education, and
experience.29 Once a certain threshold of share capital has been reached,
the lists would contribute to the appointment of the board, which would
represent either the majority or the minority of shareholders. Bylaws can
then meet the needs of their own shareholders.
Developing an effective list voting system can be accomplished in
two ways: (1) through a procedure that grants a certain percentage of the
board to minority shareholders, or (2) through ratios and percentages on
the votes obtained by each list. Then, votes must be divided by the number
of directors to be elected, with each director assigned a quotient according
to the expected order on the list and, in the event of a tie, preferring the
candidates appearing on the list that received the majority of votes or, in
their absence, favoring the eldest ones.
The list voting system was introduced to protect minorities,
encourage their participation,30 avoid the presentation of empty or nonrepresentative lists, and elect a suitably balanced board. These goals were
the objectives of the 2005 Savings Law, implemented by the SHRD II

29. On November 14, 2016, the European Central Bank launched a public
consultation on the development of the guidelines that will regulate the verification of
directors’ eligibility under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The Capital Requirements
Directive (CRD IV) suggested to verify these requirements considering conflicts of
interest, independent judgments and time constraints. The banking sector is proving to be
an area in which regulation is advancing at a particularly fast pace. On the one hand, the
board members must be people of true integrity and ensure a sound and prudent
management. Council 2013/36, art. 91, 2013 O.J. (L 176) (EU). On the other hand, they
must act with independence of judgment, assessing, in the absence of interest, that the
conflict is not in itself a sign that the representative must act with the necessary
independence of judgment. Id. In the event that the board is composed of the exponents
of the main monitoring functions (e.g. risk management and compliance), the newly
appointed directors responsible for overseeing these tasks will be assessed as board
members while, in other cases, the guidance will also apply to those who hold important
positions to the extent permitted by national legislation. Id.
30. Corrado Malberti & Emiliano Sironi, L’Adeguamento delle Società Quotate alla
Procedura di Nomina del Consiglio di Amministrazione mediante Voto di Lista:
Un’Analisi Empirica, 53 RIV. SOC. 724, 726 & n.3 (2008) (It.).
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that introduced “gender quotas”31 and bolstered by the codes of corporate
governance.32
1. Slates Presentation and Connection Among the Lists
The right to present a list may be correctly considered intimately
linked to the voting right in the shareholders general meeting (GM),33
depriving shareholders of their legitimate—and, indeed, existing—
interest is not immune to consequences. Shareholder-investors have
strong reasons for, and interest in, influencing profitability issues.
The “Italian SEC” has been asked to regulate how lists are presented
and voted on, as well as the cases in which there are connections between
them. 34 This has resulted in a series of hypotheses in which the
phenomenon occurs.

31. See M. Bianco, A. Ciaverella & R. Signoretti, Women on Boards in Italy 9 (Oct.
2011) http://www.consob.it/documents/11973/204072/qdf70.pdf/92de8d75-ea5b-4d0eaeac-6b91ef866ebc [https://perma.cc/36SD-J35C]. See generally Lucia Calvosa &
Serenella Rossi, Gli Equilibri di Genere Negli Organi di Amministrazione e Controllo
delle Imprese, OSSERVATORIO DEL DIRITTO CIVILE & COMMERCIALE [OSS. DIR. CIV. &
COMM.] 3 (2013) (It.); Massimo R. De Ritis, L’Introduzione delle c.d. Quote Rosa negli
Organi di Amministrazione e Controllo di Società Quotate, 35 LE NUOVE LEGGI CIVILI
COMMENTATE 309 (2012) (It.); Chiara Garilli, Le Azioni Positive nel Diritto Societario:
le Quote di Genere nella Composizione degli Organi della Società per Azioni, in EUROPA
DIR. PRIV. 885 (2012) (It.); Umberto Morera, Sulle Ragioni dell’Equilibrio di Genere
negli Organi delle Società Quotate e Pubbliche, 112 RIV. DIR. COMM. 155 (2014) (It.).
32. Marco Baglioni & Giampaolo Grasso, Nuovo Codice di Autodisciplina Delle
Società Quotate, 9 SOCIETÀ 1061, 1061 (2006) (It.).
33. This is strictly related to the fact that it is aligned to Decreto Legislativo 24
febbraio 1998, n.58 G.U. July 12, 2011, n.120 at art. 147-ter (It.), as well as to Decreto
Legislativo 28 dicembre 2005, n.262 G.U. Dec. 29, 2006, n.303 at art. 4 (It.). It advances
the possibility of supporting candidates during GMs, consistently to the right to set a
minimum quorum for the election of directors taken from the minority list. The
consideration cannot, however, be transposed without any variation or adjustment in
dissimilar contexts, therefore, Assonime calls for a timely intervention by the
Supervisory Authority with reference to one-tier and two-tier systems. See Nicoletta
Ciocca, IL VOTO DI LISTA NELLE SOCIETÀ PER AZIONI 388–420 (Giuffrè ed., 2018).
34. The connection by CONSOB mentioned under TUF Art. 148 is presumed,
without providing a specific list. Decreto Legislativo 24 febbraio 1998, n.58 G.U. July
12, 2011 n.120 at art. 148 (It.).

116

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXIV

The purpose of list voting is to ensure that independent minorityappointed directors 35 or auditors actually express the views of
shareholders, not only the views of tricky majorities. 36 The list that
obtained the highest number of votes must determine the directors in order
to avoid excessive harmful penalizations, even for minority
shareholders. 37 The a priori exclusion of potential directors who will
touch upon the controlling shareholders, in fact, could dangerously
exclude–due to a weak, even indirect, link–candidates of remarkable and
specific professional standing.
Shareholders who are members of the same group or of a
shareholders’ agreement may not vote, not even through a third party, for
more than one list.38 Regardless of the specific reasons that led to the
conclusion of any shareholders’ agreements, this regulation increases the
importance of the conduct of these key figures in company dynamics.
Hence, it is fundamental to value the vote of those whom, although
connected to the control group, are called upon to express an opinion on
the election of minority-appointed directors included on a given slate. In
practice, these votes show their significance when the vote of a related
entity contributes to reach the minimum threshold required by the bylaws
for the participation of a slate. Indeed, the need to know these

35. On average, almost five directors, accounting for 47.6% of boards, are
independent by TUF standards: these figures hit their highest values (respectively six and
53.6%) in financial companies in 2016. CONSOB, Report on Corporate Governance,
supra note 2, at 18. Ninety-six firms count on average about two members appointed by
minorities. CONSOB, Report on Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 19.
36. Francesco Carbonetti, Amministratori e Sindaci di Minoranza e «Rapporti di
Collegamento», 10 SOCIETÀ 1186 (2007) (It.). See also Ciocca, supra note 33, at 429–
42.
37. Although not crystal clear in its wording, which can potentially lead to
inefficiencies, the second paragraph of TUF Art. 148 suggests that the people included
in the list presented by minority shareholders should not be linked to majority
shareholders, or to those who voted the list they presented. D. Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at
art. 148 (2011) (It.).
38. D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 148 (2011) (It.).
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interrelations led to the elimination of secrecy in voting on directors,39
prior to both the filing of the slate to the issuer40 and disclosure.41
The board of directors, on the basis of a mere formal check, has to
investigate any possible connection among slates. Consequently, the
auditors are required to verify the accuracy of the directors’ investigation
in accordance with TUF Art. 149. 42 The Chairman may verify the
requirements only ex post, checking the accuracy of the procedure, the
identity and legitimacy of each person, and the voting mechanisms.43
2. Impacts of the Record Date
The differentiation between ownership and voting rights is certainly
one of the Copernican revolutions that characterized corporate law over
the last decade.44 At the same time, the introduction of this legislation,
following the implementation of the recently amended SHRD II,
encourages short-term equity investments by those who are in a
position—in terms of size and complexity of investment choices—to

39. Simone Alvaro, Giovanni Mollo & Giovanni Siciliano, Il voto di lista per la
rappresentanza di azionisti di minoranza nell’organo di amministrazione delle società
quotate, QUADERNO GIURIDICI 1, 19 (2012) (It.); see also Antonio Blandini, Riforma del
Risparmio e Società Quotate: Voto Segreto, Voto di Lista e Dintorni 3 SOCIETÀ 269,
(2006) (It.).
40. D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 147-ter (2011) (It.).
41. D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.20250 at art. 144-octies (2018) (It.).
42. D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 149 (2011) (It.).
43. There is no doubt that Codice Civil Art. 2371 only draws a minimal list of
powers, so that the prerogatives listed above cannot be taken away or varied due to
bylaws or other corporate bodies. Codice civile [C.C.] [Civil Code] art. 2371 (It.). It is
indisputable, however, that other powers can be attributed to the President according to
the bylaws, shareholders’ regulations, and resolutions. See Filippo Laurini, Articolo
2371: Presidenza dell’assemblea, in COMMENTARIO ALLA RIFORMA DELLE SOCIETÀ 147,
147–87 (Piergaetano Marchetti, Luigi Bianchi, Federico Ghezzi & Mario Notari eds.,
2005) (It.).
44. Italian law provides that a statement must be made to the issuer confirming the
attendance of shareholders’ meetings and the exercise of voting rights by the end of the
third trading day prior to the date of the shareholders’ meeting on first call, or other
deadline established in the Articles of Association of companies. D. Lgs. n. 58 (1998),
n.120 at art. 83-sexies (2011) (It.). It is surely significant that after this deadline, all
credits and debts entries shall not be considered for the purposes of voting rights at GMs.
See id.
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consciously carry out their roles as strategic members and, more
generally, institutional investors.45
To ensure maximum certainty in identifying persons entitled to
exercise these rights at the GMs, and to avoid the immobilization (even if
temporary) of the shares, Article 83-sexies reveals the true owners of the
shares and also reports the votes of those who no longer hold any interest
in the company.46 This prevents any abuse by hedge funds and, in broad
strokes, by investors who intend to strategically influence the issuers.47
To present slates, it is necessary to establish “another” record date
that affords shareholders a reasonable amount of time for their
organization. 48 Such date is directly linked to the day the list is filed,
approximately forty-five days before the date set for the GM.49 It is not
viable or acceptable to grant the right to file one’s own list, even if it is
compliant with the rules on relationships and avoids risk of potential
abuse.
The presentation of slates facilitates cooperation in an
incontrovertible way.50
Some authors believe that shareholders’ agreements for the joint
presentation of slates cannot be construed as a shareholders’ agreement
aimed at exercising voting rights and requiring prior consultation among
them, since they are not limited to shareholders’ vote.51 In this case, no
obligation is assumed with regard to the vote that will be cast at GMs.52
Instead, one common decision is agreed upon based on the achievement
of the minimum threshold of share ownership that the bylaws generally
45. Matteo Maria Erede, L’esercizio del Diritto di Intervento e Voto in Assemblea di
Società con Titoli Quotati: Alcune Riflessioni in Tema di Legittimazione e Titolarità in
Seguito all’Introduzione della Record Date, in SCRITTI GIURIDICI PER PIERGAETANO
MARCHETTI 237–74, 240 (2011) (It.).
46. See D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 83-sexies (2011) (It.).
47. See Erede, supra note 45, at 248.
48. See D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 125-bis, 147-ter (2011) (It.).
49. See D.Lgs. n.58 (1998), n.120 at art. 125-bis (2011) (It.).
50. Chiara Mosca, Attivismo degli Azionisti, Voto di Lista e “Azione di Concerto”,
58 RIV. SOC. 118, 141 (2013) (It.).
51. See generally, Pietro M. Fioruzzi & Francesco Lione, Il Problema delle Clausole
Statutarie di Società Quotate che Attribuiscono al Consiglio di Amministrazione il Potere
di Presentare una Lista per la Nomina di Amministratori o Sindaci, 4 RIV. DIR. SOC. 85,
89-95 (2007) (It.).
52. Gian Franco Campobasso, Voto di Lista e Patti Parasociali nelle Società
Quotate, 56 BANCA BORSA 125, 129 (2003).
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provide for the submission of slates.53 The power to vote for or against
the list does not actually correspond to the duty to vote for or against it.54
Accordingly, such arrangement creates a free and unplanned aggregation
prompted by list voting; however, the arrangement cannot take the form
of a consultation agreement that requires a prior discussion of the matter
because it is far from achieving a spontaneous aggregation.55
Other authors, however, believe that such agreements should be
related to TUF Art. 122, as it seems unlikely that they will lead to even
minimal consultation on voting methods. 56 It would be difficult to
imagine that such an arrangement, at least implicitly, does not include the
obligation to vote for the list jointly submitted.
II. LIST VOTING IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: AN OVERVIEW
The U.S. practice of list voting cannot be interchanged
transnationally.57 Even if list voting “offers greater certainty with respect
to its impact on the composition of the board, and for this reason [it] can
be, at the same time, less frightening to controlling groups and more
reliable for qualified minorities,” evaluations need to be mindful of the

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 132; see also Mosca, supra note 50, at 139 nn.51 & 53.
Marco Ventoruzzo, La composizione del consiglio di amministrazione delle
società quotate dopo il d.lgs. n. 303 del 2006: prime osservazioni, 52 RIV. SOC. 225-26
(2005) (It.).
57. See generally Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for
Corporate Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2009) (discussing the
inadequacy of a myopic comparison, and of a blind ranking, between the rules of different
jurisdictions with different shareholder structures). For an overview of the systems in the
United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, see Belcredi & Caprio, supra note
12, at 26. As to legal transplants, the literature is certainly rich. See generally William
Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 489 (1995); Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37
MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974); Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in
Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994); Eric Stein, Uses,
Misuses—and Nonuses of Comparative Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 198 (1977); Gunther
Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in
New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998); Alan Watson, The Birth of Legal
Transplants, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 605 (2013).
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operation of each legal system.58 As recently suggested by leading authors
in the field:
There is a convergent practice on the presence of independent
directors on the board, whether in a two-tier board structure (for the
supervisory board) or a one-tier structure. Yet the number of
independent directors diverge; most common is two or three by law
and [fifty] percent by voluntary measures (via a “comply or explain”
Code). Jurisdictions vary on the numbers and ratios. Moreover,
“national approaches on the definition of independence for
independent directors vary considerably, particularly with regard to
maximum tenure and independence from a significant shareholder.”
These differences would predictably result in divergence on the
independence-in-fact of nominally “independent” directors and
indeed, their putative function.59

List voting would be beneficial to minority shareholders when there
is a controlling shareholder, but not when the corporation exceeds a
certain size. It is preferable to create a single list composed of independent
directors, drawn up by the nomination committee of the outgoing board,
to be submitted to shareholders with voting rights.60 With a single list, the
directors who obtained the highest number of votes would be elected, and,
if the minimum number of directors required is not reached, the appointed
directors would co-opt other directors, excluding those who have not
obtained the vote of the activists. The selected names would then be
submitted to the shareholders, thus allowing institutional investors to
influence the composition of the board, even without making direct
decisions.
Other authors allege that this change is simply a replication of the
system that already exists in the United States, but in a radically different

58. Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in Directors’ Elections: A
Revolution in the Making, 8 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 105, 144 (2011).
59. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Board 3.0 (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 15) (citing ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT 2017 Corporate Governance Factbook at 95-96, 98-100, 108-111).
60. See Luca Enriques & Luigi Zingales, Il Voto di Lista non Basta nei Big a
Capitale Diffuso, IL SOLE 24 ORE (May 21, 2015) (It.), https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/
commenti-e-idee/2015-05-21/il-voto-lista-non-basta-big-capitale-diffuso—071129.sht
ml?uuid=ABwo71jD&refresh_ce=1 [https://perma.cc/689E-FDLP]. See generally
Ciocca, supra note 33.
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context.61 Thus, institutional investors would be strongly encouraged to
propose one-third or two-fifths of the board. If the list presented by
institutional investors obtains the highest number of votes, a higher
number of directors would somehow connect to it, even if the absolute
majority was not elected.
Because a complete country-based study would be impossible for the
purposes of this article, the overview provided herein should be seen as a
background against which empirical findings should be placed.
In the United States, independent directors first appeared mainly as
a result of the Penn Central scandal. 62 Whether minority shareholders
should appoint independent directors is still subject to debate, due to
varying corporate structures, the presence of stronger minority
shareholders and more developed institutional investors, and the absence
of abuse by majority shareholders.63 More recently, Professors Goshen
and Hamdani pointed out that:
61.
62.

See supra, Part I.A.
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the U.S., 19502005: of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1515
(2007); see also NYSE Constitution, Rule 2495H (Jan. 6, 1977); NYSE Listed Company
Manual, § 303A.01 (2015) (as amended on Nov. 25, 2009) (“Listed companies must have
a majority of independent directors. Commentary: Effective boards of directors exercise
independent judgment in carrying out their responsibilities. Requiring a majority of
independent directors will increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the
possibility of damaging conflicts of interest.”); NYSE Listed Company Manual, §
303A.02 (2015).
63. It is relevant to emphasize that, in the United States, the nomination committee
requires listed companies to have an ad hoc committee entirely composed of independent
directors, with a written regulation to tackle its purpose(s) and responsibilities, and whose
annual performance is evaluated. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A.04 (2015).
Recently, a relevant piece emphasized the need to re-define the concept and to assure a
strong enforcement to it, since “‘regulating directors’ independence is at heart a means
of empowering investors to make informed decisions about where to invest and how to
vote.” Yaron Nili, Out of Sight Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director
Independence Disclosure, 43 UNIV. J. CORP. L. 35, 35 (2017). Nili posited:
The current framework can be summed up as being too much, too little, too late and too
soft. It provides companies with too much discretion, as boards retain too much power
to assert the independence of their peer directors [,] and they may suffer from behavioral
bias in doing so. It provides investors with too little information regarding the factual
context against which a director is considered to be independent. Further, even when a
director’s independence designation is scrutinized through state law, it is often too late,
as these assessments are done post-hoc when it is too late to address many of the issues
that director independence is meant to protect against. Finally, it is too soft, as
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These prophylactic measures may be necessary to enforce the rule
against self-dealing . . . however . . . lawmakers should proceed
cautiously when constraining controllers’ power to appoint board or
management positions . . . [since] asymmetric information and
differences of opinion could prevent the controller-entrepreneur from
credibly communicating her idiosyncratic vision not only to investors,
but also to skeptical independent board members. Therefore, the need
to balance controller rights and minority protection should also shape
board reforms at firms with controlling shareholders. At a minimum,
the controller should have the power to appoint a majority of the
board, which in turn should have the power to appoint the CEO and
other members of management.64

The voice of all shareholders is vital overseas as well. Until a few
years ago, investors had a limited impact on the board composition due to
their spread and currently decreasing apathy. NYSE Rule 452, abolished
in 2009, allowed financial intermediaries to vote freely in the absence of
direction from their clients.65
In the United States, regulations facilitating the access of
shareholders to the proxy system ensure the presence of minorities on the
board.66 While the collection of proxies is rooted in the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, minority shareholders could initiate an
independent solicitation of proxies.67 However, initiating an independent
solicitation may result in disproportionate costs. A proportional
reimbursement rule, adopted either contractually or in the bylaws, would
companies’ self-designations of director independence are left uncontested and without
proper vetting by the stock exchanges or the SEC, as they have shown no effort to
proactively enforce their own requirements.

Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted). See also Puchniak & Kim, supra note 9, at 98 (“[I]t makes
perfect sense that the NYSE and NASDAQ definitions of ‘independence’ focus on
ensuring that independent directors are independent from the managers of the corporation
on whose board they sit”).
64. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
125 YALE L. J. 560, 601 (2016).
65. NYSE Listed Company Manual, Rule 452 (Jan. 11, 1968).
66. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). See also MARC. I. STEINBERG, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 184-190 (2018) (providing a brief
overview of proxy access and Rule 14a-11); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD
HENDERSON, OUTSOURCING THE BOARD: HOW BOARD SERVICE PROVIDERS CAN
IMPROVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 171-172 (2018) (providing a brief overview of proxy
access in the United States).
67. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011).
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allow the reimbursement of expenses, at least in part, by the company
itself.68
In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, the court discussed
a proposal to insert a clause in the bylaws to allow proxy access and
reimbursement of soliciting proxies’ costs, but ultimately held that such a
clause was invalid, the approval of which would have violated the
obligations of the directors toward the company.69 Even though it was
considered invalid, the inclusion of the clause in the bylaws, and the
reimbursement of the expenses incurred by shareholders, were transposed
into Delaware legislation.70
Pursuant to Rule 14a-11, any shareholder (or shareholder group) that
held more than 3% of a public company’s shares for more than three
consecutive years was eligible to nominate candidates for up to 25% of
the board seats.71 A qualifying shareholder could exercise this privilege
as long as she declared that she would continue to hold her shares after
the annual GM and did not acquire them with the intention of changing
control of the company or obtaining more representatives than those
permitted by the law. 72 In the presence of either a staggered board or
directors already elected by the minority in the context of the GM, the
minority-appointed directors could be nominated only if they did not
exceed 25% of the total directors. 73 When the slates submitted by
minorities exceeded that limit, the company must, at the time of sending
the proxy materials, give preference to shareholders with a higher share
capital by listing the names presented by them only where still necessary
to reach the 25% threshold.74 The rule was debated but short-lived.75 The
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the defendant in Business Roundtable
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id.
953 A.2d 227, 239-40 (2008).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112-13 (2009)
See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,667, 56,674,
56,706 (Sept. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, and 249); see also
Reilly S. Steel, Proxy Access and Optimal Standardization in Corporate Governance:
An Empirical Analysis, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 173, 185-88 (2017); Jill E. Fisch,
The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L. J. 435, 466-67 (2012).
72. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 71, at 56,699.
73. See id. at 56,675.
74. See id. at 56,711-12.
75. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). See also, Bernard S.
Sharfman, What Theory and the Empirical Evidence Tell Us about Proxy Access, 13 J.
L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 36-38 (2017).
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v. SEC, opposed its application, arguing before the D.C. Circuit Court that
the main problems of proxy access are the creation of interpersonal
conflicts, the inefficient cost-benefit ratio calculated incorrectly by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and that it allows top
management to exclude proposals concerning the election of
shareholders.76
Rule 14a-8, however, remains unchanged, ensuring shareholders the
right to propose through the proxy system the use of the proxy access in
the bylaws, thus allowing a mechanism that would lead to the same
result.77 The bylaws, in fact, have created a very similar scheme to the one
initially provided for by the SEC; in order to include names on the slates
for one fifth of the eligible directors, the group of shareholders formed for
this purpose should not exceed twenty directors and should possess at
least 3% of corporate shares for three years.78
The first and, so far, the only attempt to actually use the proxy access
rule for the appointment of directors occurred in the “Gabelli Funds—
National Fuel Gas” case, in which Mario Gabelli and GAMCO Asset
Management Inc. withdrew the initial nomination, dated November 9,
2016, due to alleged violation of the bylaws.79 The latter claimed that only
passive investors could submit it, however, the tool is meant for those
directors who are not willing to influence or alter the governance of the
company.80 Gabelli evidently aimed to achieve a different goal, reiterated
in several public statements and in the use of Form 13-D, instead of Form
13-G, revealing the intention to change the corporate structure.81
76.
77.

See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2013); Danielle Vukovich, Proxy Access Voting:
Evaluating Proxy Access and the Recent Phenomenon of Corporations Adopting
Shareholder Protective Policies, 19 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 437, 446 (2018).
78. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 71, at 56,772.
79. See Notice of Proxy Access Director Nomination at the 2017 Annual Meeting of
Stockholders of National Fuel Gas Company from Paula Ciprich to David Goldman,
(November 23, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70145/0001193125167
76709/d296488dex99.htm [https://perma.cc/9XEW-CPPC].
80. See id.
81. Id. Mr. Gabelli believed that “the board still need[ed] an infusion of fresh
thinking” and that “the company should be split up with the pieces spun off” even though
a spin-off was not being considered by the company’s board. Id. “Mr. Gabelli’s
statements continue[d] to reflect GAMCO’s desire to influence management on matters
of control and [did] not disavow earlier support for splitting up the company’s business.”
Id.
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This situation poses several contentious issues for consideration: the
appropriateness of the calculation methods of shares held by different
funds under a single manager (SGR/Fund Manager), the limit to
shareholders’ aggregation set to access the proxy, the re-election
procedure, the universal proxy ballot, and the exclusion of the proposal
pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(10).82
Since the market’s concern with escaping from the “dictatorship” of
the CEO is strong, the implementation and effective use of this tool for
the purposes of appointing directors is comparable to a loaded gun.83
The phenomenon of list voting is rather rare in other countries.84
Although it has established its relevance and demonstrated its
effectiveness by ensuring proportionality in the election of governing
corporate bodies, list voting is undoubtedly an attribute of good corporate
governance, limiting agency costs, and improving the balance between
different interests, especially in cases of concentrated ownership
structures. 85 Certain countries, however, provide for shareholder
representation in various forms: (1) with the possibility of competing for
a mandatory appointment (if provided in the bylaws) (Italy, the United
States, Spain, Poland, and Brazil), (2) with the possibility of competing
for an optional appointment (Germany and France), or (3) with the right
of veto (the United Kingdom and Israel).86

82.
83.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10) (2013).
Marco Ventoruzzo, Professor, Bocconi Univ., Introductory Speech at the Italian
Corporate Governance Conference (Dec. 3, 2015), http://icgconference.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/12/Introductory-speech_Marco-Ventoruzzo_3rd-Dec.pdf [https://perma.
cc/M2F2-CNWX].
84. See Marco Ventoruzzo, Quante Sfide per la Consob, LAVOCE (May 6, 2016),
http://www.lavoce.info/archives/40937/quante-sfide-per-la-consb [https://perma.cc/7G
ZN-Z2DW]. See also Vukovich, supra note 77, at 463-68 (providing a comparative
overview of Canadian and Australian regulation).
85. See Nicolas L. Erhardt, James D. Werbel & Charles B. Shrader, Board of
Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L.
REV. 102, 107-08 (2003).
86. See, e.g., Decreto No. 6.404 de 15 dezembro 1976, Diário Oficial Da União
[D.O.U.] de 15.12.1976 at art. 243 (Braz.). See generally Secretary of the Organization
for Economic Co-Operation and Development, OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FACTBOOK (2017).
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The relevant law in Spain, which bears similarities to Italian law,87
states the principle of minority shareholder protection based on the
proportional composition of the board itself.88 It should be noted that this
technique is not widely used in Spain, due to the peculiar board
composition,89 the apathy of institutional investors, and the strong conflict
of interests.90 Shareholders, within both listed and unlisted corporations,
may gather and appoint a number of directors equal to the ratio of the
capital with voting rights and number of board members.91
In Poland, when a group of shareholders represents at least one-fifth
of the total, such group can request the election of one director, without
participating in the appointment of other directors.92
Since 2001, Brazilian corporate law allows 15% of shareholders with
voting rights and 10% of shareholders without voting rights to apply the
voto múltiplo technique, which resembles cumulative voting, though not
expressly provided for in the bylaws. 93 Nonetheless, by virtue of a
proportional board composition, in the event of the dismissal of one

87. See Approving the Consolidated Text of the Corporate Enterprises Act (R.D.L.
2010, 1) (Spain) (declaring in Article 243 that in a public limited company, shares
voluntarily grouped to constitute share capital equal to or more than the sum resulting
from dividing the capital by the number of directors are entitled to appoint the number of
directors deducted from the corresponding proportion; in the event that this option is
invoked, the shares that have been gathered in this way are not entitled to vote on the rest
of the board members).
88. See Javier Juste Mencia, La Partecipazione Della Minoranza Nella Nomina
Degli Amministratori di Società per Azioni: Sulla Possibilità di Introdurre un Sistema
Proporzionale di Elezione, 20 GIUR. COMM. 961, 975 (1994) (It.).
89. This is notably due to the presence of the “gray directors,” which are independent
directors who still maintain roles on the board after serving the company. See generally
Ana Gisbert Clemente & Begoña Navallas Labat, Corporate Governance Mechanisms
and Voluntary Disclosure: The Role of Independent Directors in the Boards of Listed
Spanish Firms 5-6 (2009), http://webs.ucm.es/centros/cont/descargas/documento16048
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P7X-DWDL].
90. See Mencia, supra note 88, at 966-67.
91. See id. at 970.
92. See THE COMMERCIAL COMPANIES CODE art. 385, § 3 (Pol.).
93. See Decreto No. 6.404 de 15 dezembro 1976, Diário Oficial Da União [D.O.U.]
de 15.12.1976 at art. 141 (Braz.); see also Érica Gorga, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho &
Bernard S. Black, The Corporate Governance of Privately Controlled Brazilian Firms, 7
REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE FINANÇAS 385, 398-99 (2009).
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director, and in accordance with the simul stabunt, simul cadent rule, the
entire board would cease to function.94
Other countries attach great importance to the voice of employees,
including Germany,95 Austria, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, France,
and Finland, albeit the latter two also have opt-in mechanisms that are
weaker than those allowing employees holding more than 3% of the share
capital to appoint one or more directors.96 According to Aktiengesetz, the
German Stock Corporate Code, the election of certain members may be
reserved to certain shareholders or to specific categories of shares
transferable with the consent of the company.97 Also, shareholders may
propose the name of a director, if any, and make it available (via the
website, if the company is listed) at least fourteen days prior to the GMs.98
Finally, each shareholder has the right to propose candidates for the
appointment of the supervisory board.99 This provision strengthens the
position of employees, who are specially and specifically protected by
this technique.
In the event that the bylaws mention the codetermination model, the
board of a public company can be composed of four representatives
selected by employees. 100 In non-public companies, there can be three
such representatives if the board is composed of more than fifteen
directors, and two representatives if the board has fewer than fifteen
directors. 101 In public companies with more than two thousand
employees, however, the employees’ representatives should not exceed

94. Piergaetano Marchetti, Gianfranco Siciliano & Marco Ventoruzzo, Dissenting
Directors, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in L., Paper No. 332,
2016) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2854768## [https://perma.cc
/KT9Y-CPQM].
95. See generally Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A
Study of German Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 863 (2004) (explaining the
effectiveness of the model, especially with regard to performance target).
96. Holly J. Gregory & Robert T. Simmelkjaer, II, Comparative Study of Corporate
Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and Its Member States (2002).
97. See Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965 BGBL I § 101
(Ger.).
98. See id. § 1262.
99. See id. § 127.
100. See Mitbestimmung [MitbestG] [Law on Employee Participation], May 4, 1976
BGBL I at 1153, last amended, Apr. 24, 2015, BGBL I at 642, art 7 (Ger.).
101. Id.
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half of the board.102 On the other hand, in private companies and public
companies with fewer than two thousand employees, employees’
representatives can be a maximum of one third of the board, assuming the
company is composed of at least twenty employees.103
France does not regulate the appointment of directors and, except as
provided by law, does not select representatives of specific groups and
interests.104
Russian law provides that the GMs may revoke the entire board, not
just one of its members, and elect its plenum using cumulative voting, as
provided for in the bylaws (or mandatorily for the corporations with more
than a thousand shareholders). 105 The normative framework–which is
careful in identifying, assessing, and managing conflicts of interest–
allows minority-appointed directors to prevent any potentially dangerous
action on the part of executive directors and controlling shareholders.106
Chinese legislation adopts cumulative voting, in which the voting
rights attributable to each shareholder would be multiplied by the number
of seats available and could converge in one person having many votes.107

102.
103.
104.

See Gorton & Schmid, supra note 95, at 864.
See id.
Code de gouvernance d’entreprise des sociétés cotées [Corporate Governance
Code of Listed Corporations] art. 2.3 (Fr.)
105. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 66
(Russ.).
106. Id. at art. 81-84.
107. Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó gōngsī fǎ (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective Mar. 1, 2013) 2005 STANDING COMM. NAT’L
PEOPLE’S CONG GAZ. art. 105, 106 (China). Until 2001, the cumulative voting system
was not suggested for listed companies with controlling shareholders owning more than
the 30% of the share capital. Zhōngguó shàngshì gōngsī zhìlǐ zhǔnzé (中国上市公司治理准
则) [Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China] (promulgated by the
China Sec. Reg. Comm. Jan. 1, 2001) art. 31, at 1, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/
code_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NAL-X3AU] (China). Such companies shall implement
their bylaws and are encouraged to adopt cumulative voting in the election of directors
(including independent directors) and supervisors. In case a shareholder holds solely (or
collectively with affiliated parties) over 50% of the equity interest of a securities
company, cumulative voting shall be used in the election of directors (including
independent ones) and supervisors. Zhèngquàn gōngsī zhàn dìng gōngsī zhìlǐ zhǔnzé(证
券公司暂定公司治理准则) [Provisional Code of Corporate Governance for Securities
Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm. 2004) art. 17, http://www.ecgi.
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Japanese law has proven to be “quite strong” on this matter, even
though foreign investors criticize Japanese law for not adequately
protecting shareholders’ interests.108 If the majority of voting shares are
present at the GM, the board is elected by simple majority, allowing
shareholders to take a decisive role, including the proposal of
candidates.109
In light of the considerations outlined above, it is difficult to express
an opinion on list voting and its “travels” in a clear and decisive global
sense. It is therefore appropriate to seek a different tool to assess whether
list voting deserves a chance to realize its full potential and be
implemented in different jurisdictions.
III. LIST VOTING AND DIVIDEND POLICIES: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
A. OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES
This part will present empirical data that shows the impact of list
voting on corporate boards, 110 especially from those authors who are
influenced by an Anglo-Saxon, rather than German, tradition.111 Thus, the
much-debated topic of dividend policies emphasizes how vital it is to
balance interests and demonstrate the essential role of independent
org/codes/documents/provisional_cgcode_csrc. pdf [https://perma.cc/82HR-TFDH]
(China).
108. See Gen Goto, Legally “Strong” Shareholders of Japan, 3 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY
& VENTURE CAP. L. 125, 126-27 (2014) (highlighting that the Japanese Code provides
for particularly strong protective mechanisms for single shareholders and holders of
special categories of shares).
109. Id. at 132, 135.
110. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (2000).
111. “Empiricism is also a unifying theme of several of the increasingly influential
interdisciplinary approaches to the study of law.” Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S.
Ulen, Symposium: Empirical and Experimental Methods of Law: Introduction, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 791, 791 (2002). Among scholars, in fact, there are three “species” of
researchers (“clams, dolphins, and plankton”) that also differ in their approaches to
studying: doers, users, or critics. This could lead to multiple combinations emerging: “a
dolphin would include the ‘movers and shakers of the legal academy[,] grounded in
traditional legal scholarship [but using] empirical research to increase our understanding
of the law and to add to the tools available to legal researchers.’” Id. at 792-93; see also
Shari Seidman Diamond, Empirical Marine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins, and
Plankton, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 803, 808 (2002).
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minority-appointed directors. 112 Managers, in fact, can freely use (and
abuse) cash flows for personal purposes through the manipulation of
dividend distribution.113
The issue of dividend policies has recently been re-examined in
different countries. Recent studies have found two correlations in
particular: first, between the existence of dividend policies and the
presence of women on boards,114 and second, between the existence of
dividend policies and certain key characteristics of independent directors,
including tenure, functions, and remuneration. 115 This suggests that it
112. Cf. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disappearing Dividends: Changing
Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2001); Jorge
Farinha, Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment
Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis, 30 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1173, 1173-74 (2003);
Aidong Hu & Praveen Kumar, Managerial Entrenchment and Payout Policy, 39 J. FIN.
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 759, 759-61 (2004); Fuxiu Jiang, Yunbiao Ma & Beibei Shi,
Stock Liquidity and Dividend Payouts, 42 J. CORP. FIN. 295, 295 (2017) (providing
evidence that the “positive relation between stock liquidity and dividend payouts is more
pronounced when the information environment is opaque, and when conflict between
controlling shareholders and minority investors is severe”); Hao Wang, Managerial
Entrenchment, Equity Payout and Capital Structure, 35 J. BANK. & FIN. 36, 36-37 (2011).
113. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 650, 651, 653 (1984); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 323, 323
(1986); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976).
114. See Jie Chen, Woon Sau Leung & Marc Goergen, The Impact of Board Gender
Composition on Dividend Payouts, 43 J. CORP. FIN. 86, 87 (2017); María Consuelo
Pucheta-Martínez & Inmaculada Bel-Oms, The Board of Directors and Dividend Policy:
The Effect of Gender Diversity, 25 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 523, 526-28 (2016).
115. See Suba R. Yarram & Brian E. Dollery, Corporate Governance and Financial
Policies: Influence of Board Characteristics on the Dividend Policy of Australian Firms,
41 MANAGERIAL FIN. 267, 268 (2015). See generally Timothy G. Coville & Gary
Kleinman, Independent Directors and Dividend Payouts in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era,
in 18 SUSTAINABILITY AND GOVERNANCE (ADVANCES IN PUBLIC INTEREST ACCOUNTING)
57 (Cheryl R. Leyman ed., 2015) (revealing a positive relationship between firms
compelled by law to change boards and payout policies, when compared to firms that
pre-adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate board composition requirements); Amy E. Ji,
Board Financial Expertise and Corporate Payout Policy, 19 J. APP. BUS. & ECON. 10
(2017) (finding that a greater percentage of financial experts on company boards leads to
the adoption of payout policies based only on repurchases, instead of dividends); Lucas
Setia-Atmaja, Dividend and Debt Policies of Family Controlled Firms: The Impact of
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would be extremely difficult for minority shareholders to be adequately
safeguarded, at least in most cases, without appointing independent
directors. As this Article will investigate further, it appears that the link
between the presence of minority-appointed independent directors and the
propensity to distribute dividends is strong.
As a premise, it is worthwhile to illustrate the line of research. The
following sections aim to clarify the research design and the sources used
to retrieve the necessary information. Extensive literature was taken into
account, both to recognize the historically significant contributions on the
topic, and to identify the variables deemed essential to carry out the
quantitative study and develop the arguments.
B. OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Some corporate governance mechanisms are meant to increase
“transparency, accountability and efficiency of corporate governance” in
order to aid independent (and independent minority-appointed)
directors. 116 Multiple international studies of these mechanisms
demonstrate that there is an increased risk that shareholders holding less
than 10 to 20% of the shares overly influence the board—even appointing
its majority—thus, controlling the strategic decisions despite their limited
investments. 117 Furthermore, independent directors are crucial in both
Board Independence, 6 INT’L J. MANAGERIAL FIN. 128 (2010); Vineeta Sharma,
Independent Directors and the Propensity to Pay Dividends, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 1001, 100204 (2011). A recent study also examined dividend payouts, but used a novel measure: coopted directors, who are appointed after the incumbent CEO assumed office and their
presence leads to a weaker tendency to pay dividends. See generally Pornsit Jiraporn &
Sang M. Lee, Do Co-Opted Directors Influence Dividend Policy?, 47 FIN. MGMT. 349
(2018).
116. Nuria Reguera-Alvarado & Francisco Bravo, The Effect of Independent
Directors’ Characteristics on Firm Performance: Tenure and Multiple Directorship, 41
RES. IN INT’L. BUS. & FIN. 590, 591 (2017).
117. See Sandra Cavaco, Patricia Crifo, Antoine Rebérioux & Gwenael Roudaut,
Independent Directors: Less Informed but Better Selected than Affiliated Board
Members?, 43 J. CORP. FIN. 106, 108-10 (2017); Yong Wang, Penjian Jin & Chongsheng
Yang, Relations Between the Professional Backgrounds of Independent Directors in
State-Owned Enterprises and Corporate Performance, 42 INT’L. REV. ECON. & FIN. 404,
405-06 (2016); see also Harald Baum, The Rise of the Independent Director: A Historical
and Comparative Perspective 2, 5 (Max Planck Private Law Research Paper No. 16/20,
2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814978 [https://perma.cc/
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dispersed and concentrated corporate structures,118 looking to Italy as a
leading example in terms of protection of the minority shareholders’
rights, thanks to the Italian practice of list voting.
The discussion on independent directors and their propensity to pay
dividends, initially proposed by Modigliani and Miller,119 still remains a
real “puzzle.” 120 A prudent dividend policy could concretely mitigate
conflicts of interest between controlling and minority shareholders.

T5N4-CU4V] (claiming that independent directors are strongly connected to the context
in which they operate, even though path dependence is not always considered in
theoretical discussions and practice as a true panacea for governance issues); Wei Cai,
The Dilemmas of Independent Directors in China: An Empirical and Comparative Study,
18 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 123, 147-48 (2017); Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, “Captured
Boards”: The Rise of “Super Directors” and the Case for a Board Suite, 2017 WIS. L.
REV. 19, 31-32; Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’
Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L. J. 97, 120 (2016). For studies about the link between investment
and performance, see generally, Wei Jiang, Hualin Wan & Shan Zhao, Reputation
Concerns of Independent Directors: Evidence from Individual Director Voting, 29 REV.
FIN. STUD. 655 (2016); Yu F. Kuang & Gladys Lee, Corporate Fraud and External Social
Connectedness of Independent Directors, 45 J. CORP. FIN. 401 (2017); Huilong Liu, Hong
Wang & Liansheng Wu, Removing Vacant Chairs: Does Independent Directors’
Attendance at Board Meetings Matter?, 133 J. BUS. ETHICS 375 (2016); Piergaetano
Marchetti, Gianfranco Siciliano & Marco Ventoruzzo, Dissenting Directors, (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in L., Paper No. 332, 2016)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2854768## [https://perma.cc/KT
9Y-CPQM]; Ronald Masulis & Emma Jincheng Zhang, Preoccupied Independent
Directors (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Fin., Paper No. 522,
2017)
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/5222017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZMT-Z85F]; Dan W. Puchniak & Luh L. Lan, Independent Directors
in Singapore: Puzzling Compliance Requiring Explanation, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 265
(2017); Jigao Zhu, Kangtao Ye, Jennifer W. Tucker & Kam C. Chan, Board Hierarchy,
Independent Directors, and Firm Value: Evidence from China, 41 J. CORP. FIN. 262
(2016).
118. Ferrarini & Filippelli, supra note 12, at 30 (stressing that independent directors
represent a tool to strengthen the role of the management, primarily in contexts of
dispersed ownership). See also Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1282-83;
Strampelli, supra note 5, at 14-19.
119. See generally Merton H. Miller & Franco Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth,
and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411 (1961); see also S. Paulo & C. Gale, The
Miller-Modigliani 1961 Ponzi Scheme, Alias “Dividend Irrelevance”, 54 INT’L J.L.
MGMT. 234, 234-35 (2012) (emphasizing the crucial role that Miller & Modigliani’s
original paper continues to have in modern scholarly literature).
120. Sharma, supra note 115, at 1001.
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Dividends may, in fact, curb agency problems and reduce agency costs.121
A higher dividend policy would increase the likelihood of using external
funds more frequently.122 This could lead to conflicts of interest due to
asymmetric information between shareholders and management when the
company generates a cash flow that is not in line with its investment
opportunities. Dividend policy is negatively correlated to close corporate
structure 123 and close ownership, 124 and positively correlated to
shareholders’ agreements, confirming that the protection of minority
shareholders’ concerns remains an absolutely fundamental issue in Italian
corporate law.125
C. DATASET: SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
During this research (the basic guidelines of which have been
outlined above), it was difficult to identify all the independent directors126
appointed in the period between 2005 and 2015, and to determine whether
they were appointed from minority lists. In Italy, there is no
comprehensive official database for figures on independent directors, as
is also the case, unexpectedly, in China.127 Accordingly, for the purposes
121. See Michael S. Rozeff, Growth, Beta and Agency Costs as Determinants of
Dividend Payout Ratios, 5 J. FIN. RESEARCH 249, 249-50 (1982). See generally Eugene
F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON.
301, 308 (1983) (discussing various means of mitigating agency costs).
122. See Easterbrook, supra note 113, at 656.
123. See Mara Faccio, Larry H. P. Lang & Leslie Young, Dividends and
Expropriation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 54, 55 (2001).
124. See Luciana Mancinelli & Aydin Ozkan, Ownership Structure and Dividend
Policy: Evidence from Italian Firms, 12 EUR. J. FIN. 265, 267 (2006).
125. Id. at 269. Some possible pathways of causation must be emphasized: more
independent directors will pay more dividends, whereas less independent directors lead
to an increased need to signal with dividends. Thus, list voting should lead to fewer
dividends.
126. Independent directors are defined pursuant to Codice di Autodisciplina
[Corporate Governance Code] Luglio 2018, art. 3, Jul. 2018, (It.).
127. Many studies focus on the implications of independent directors because they
serve as an important source of inspiration for further development in corporate
governance. For examples, see generally Easterbrook, supra note 113; Murya Habbash,
Are Independent Directors and Supervisory Directors Effective in Constraining Earnings
Management?, 5 J. FIN. ACCT. & MGMT. 125 (2014); Guoqiang Hu, Rongli Yuan & Jason
Zezhong Xiao, Can Independent Directors Improve Internal Control Quality in China?,
23 EUR. J. FIN. 626 (2014); Liu, Wang & Wu, supra note 117; Yi Quan & Sihai Li, Are
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of this study, creation of such a database was an extremely important step.
The relevant data, collected piece by piece, did not include the companies
listed on the Italian Alternative Investment Market (the sub-market of the
Milan Stock Exchange dedicated to SMEs), which is characterized by
flexible regulation and for which publication on the website of both
reports on governance and remuneration is not required.
DataStream, a well-known factual database in the financial and
economic field worldwide, allowed for identification of all listed Italian
companies. As of June 30, 2016, there were 273 listed companies on the
Borsa Italiana’s Main Market (MTA). 128 The study then evaluated the
consolidated financial statements, the ownership structure, the reports on
corporate governance, and remuneration of all companies identified by
Datastream in order to choose all the independent directors to be
examined.
Next, the study examined corporate governance and remuneration
reports to determine whether the directors were selected from a slate
submitted by majority or minority shareholders. If such information was
not provided in those reports, then the study looked to the website of the
company (where slates for the renewal of the board are uploaded), or
inspected the minutes of the GMs for the appointment of directors (in
which slates are mentioned in detail or to which slates are attached), for
the years after the introduction of compulsory list voting systems.
Finally, the study extrapolated from DataStream financial data
related to dividend distribution, mainly, payments, sales, cash flow, total
assets, return on assets, and annual earnings, all of which are necessary to
tackle the CEO duality issues. The study also evaluated M&A deals,
which were retrieved from Thomson One. The sample consists of 1260
observations.
Academic Independent Directors Punished More Severely When They Engage in
Violations?, 10 CHINA J. ACCT. RES. 71 (2017); Xuesong Tang, Jun Du & Qingchuan
Hou, The Effectiveness of the Mandatory Disclosure of Independent Directors’ Opinions:
Empirical Evidence from China, 32 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 89 (2013); Zhu, Ye, Tucker
& Chan, supra note 117. Indeed, there is no shortage of studies regarding how to increase
minority shareholders’ protections in and related to the new form of cumulative voting
in China. See Wenjia Yan, Cumulative Voting: In the US (Declining), in China (Rising)
and the EU (Not-Adopted), 12 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 79, 80 (2015).
128. There were two potential issues affecting, and even slightly distorting, the study:
companies could have been listed at any time from 2005 to 2015, or companies could
have been listed from 2005 but de-listed before the end of June 2016.
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The analysis accounts for certain parameters normally used for data
classification, which are linked to the sector in which each company
operates (keeping in mind the Super Sector indices used by the Italian
Stock Exchange that, in turn, refer to Industry Classification Benchmark
aggregates). 129 This classification is informative given the significant
differences among categories, and it serves to illustrate evolutionary
developments and, de iure condendo, to identify the areas in which more
emphasis should be placed in the regulation of list voting.
The following statistical analysis uses an Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) model, commonly used in the analysis of clustered data. It should
be noted that the model does not include some variables that
simultaneously determine both the independent variable (independent
directors) and the dependent variable (payout dividends). Thus, the causal
relationship between the two variables is not very close (and could even
be reversed, whereby more independent directors may be appointed to
distribute more dividends).130
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
This Article aims to investigate the role of independent directors,
particularly minority-appointed independent directors, to verify their
quality, the effectiveness of list voting, and the increase in the value of
dividend payouts. Thus, the following assumptions are tested:
H1: Companies with a significant number of independent directors
favor high levels of dividends. As previously stated, independent
directors carry out monitoring functions to protect the interests of
shareholders, overseeing the correct management of the dividend
policy.

129. See, e.g., Borsa Italiana, STOCK INDICES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.
borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/statistiche/statistiche-indici/statistiche-indici.en.htm
[https://perma.cc/9QB4-224Z].
130. Based on a two-stage regression, the Heckman correction (which is commonly
used to correct selection bias) allows for calculating the predicted values of the X
variable, even before the regression analysis is applied. In other words, the Heckman
correction purifies the X variable of those omitted variables that could blame the
coefficient when carrying out the regression. Future research could refine this study with
an Instrumental Variable approach.
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H2: Companies with a high number of independent minorityappointed directors favor high levels of dividends. In light of the
importance of independent minority-appointed directors, it is
appropriate to verify how their presence leads to tangible benefits for
shareholders.
H3: Independent minority-appointed directors are particularly
effective in companies with a concentrated ownership structure. It is
widely accepted that the controlling shareholders affect the
appointment of independent directors.131 If minority directors really
intend to enrich and protect minority shareholders, their presence in
closely-held companies should be more active. To the contrary, their
role would be less significant in widespread ownership structures,
where the gap between majority and minority shareholders is less
perceived.132

E. METHODOLOGY
The analysis consists of two phases: the first phase focuses on the
probability of distribution of the higher dividends if at least one-third of
the board consists of independent directors, and the second phase
evaluates such probability if the board consists of more than 15% of
independent minority-appointed directors.
Two models are used to verify the first hypothesis: one model
includes the fixed effects of each industry and the time horizon, while the
second model does not. The same process is applied to the second
hypothesis in order to understand these effects, even when the control
variable is linked to the presence of directors taken from the minority list.
The analysis took into consideration the characteristics of the
sample, noting that more than a third of the board is composed of
independent directors, and that more than 15% of the board itself is
composed of minority-appointed directors and the CEO-duality is
131.
132.

Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 5, at 1286-87.
Although the hypothesis is verified with regard to the Italian context, the result
is, of course, also applicable to other widely-held corporate scenarios, and, therefore, in
the United States (where the number of public corporations halved in the last twenty years
from more than 8,000 in 1996 to about 4,100 in 2012). Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi
& René Stulz, The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 464 (2017); Gustavo Grullon,
Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated?,
(Oct. 25, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2612047 [https://perma.cc/C8N6-K9DB].
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respected. Additional features linked to the likelihood of dividend
distribution, such as dividend payout ratio, cash flow, return on assets
(ROA), and annual profit, were also considered.
One would expect a positive impact on the distribution of dividends
as a form of protection of shareholders’ interests, especially those of
minority shareholders. This would be verified if the dummy variables
relating to independent directors taken from the list submitted by the
majority or minority shareholders have positive coefficients. 133 The
analysis therefore requires a preliminary verification of the presence of
independent directors (and of minority-appointed directors) on the boards
in the sample.
While the degree of independence of Italian directors has clearly
increased over time since 2010, the number of directors chosen from the
lists presented by minority shareholders increased in the period between
2006 and 2009, and then declined slightly until 2011 (Figure 1),
confirming the data reported by CONSOB. 134 Probably, during the
financial crisis, the significant costs of disclosing the lists led to the
conclusion that the mechanism was unnecessary and inefficient.

133. As to the former, the dummy variable is 1, if independent directors are more than
a third of the entire board, and as to the latter, the dummy variable is 1, if independent
minority-appointed directors are at least 15% of the board.
134. See CONSOB, Report on Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 27-28. For the
benefit of readers less familiar with Italian company law, it is worth highlighting that
corporate bodies are generally appointed for a term of three years, but a company’s
bylaws can vary during this term. Codice di Autodisciplina [Corporate Governance Code]
Luglio 2015, art. 5, Jul. 2015, (It.). The members of the corporate body may be re-elected,
unless otherwise provided for in the bylaws. Id. Thus, staggered boards are extremely
rare in listed companies.
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Fig. 1
Degree of independence of minority-appointed directors
in Italian boards over time.

Interestingly, half of the sample is concentrated in the following
sectors: banking (250 observations, 19.84%), construction and materials
(119 observations, 9.44%), and automotive and electronic or electrical
components (73 observations each, 11.58%).135
The distribution of observations seems constant during the period
under consideration. In the aftermath of the introduction of the list voting
technique, observations are as expected, albeit slightly lower.136
As to the variables, it is worth reinforcing the relevance of the
average dividend payout ratio (0.02) (see also, the dividend payout
variable), and its median (0.01).137 More than half of the companies in the
sample (59%) have a significant number of independent directors (at least
one-third of the board), while 13% of them have at least 15% of minority
directors.
Pearson’s correlation coefficient, also known as the linear
correlation coefficient, is also particularly significant in assessing the
relationship between the distribution of dividends and (1) independent
directors (= 1, if more than one third of the directors are independent); (2)
minority-appointed independent directors (= 1, if the independent
minority-appointed directors are more than 15%); (3) cash flow deriving
135.
136.
137.

See infra Appendix – Table 1.
See infra Appendix – Table 2.
See infra Appendix – Table 3.
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from operations over total assets; (4) CEO duality (= 1, if the CEO is also
the Chairman of the board at the time of the payment of the dividend
payout); (5) ROA (average annual return on total assets calculated as net
income on total assets); (6) negative earnings (= 1, if earnings are
negative).138 A positive correlation exists in connection to independent
minority directors, cash flow, and ROA, while a negative one exists in
connection to the presence of independent directors, CEO duality, and
negative earnings. Therefore, not only is the distribution of dividends
more efficient with independent directors, but it is even more efficient
with minority-appointed independent directors. This is neither obvious
nor intuitive, but relevant. Finally, correlation with the financial variables
is in line with the initial assumptions. Additionally, regarding the CEO
duality (i.e. that it is negatively linked to dividends), the research once
more suggests that the same person should not be both the CEO and the
Chairperson.139
The tables below show the results of the regression, obtained by
investigating the effect of independent directors and independent minority
directors (Table 1) on the number of dividends paid. As anticipated, the
two models (Column 1 and 2) differ in their assessment of industrial
sectors and time period, the effects of which are only considered in
Column 2.
Reading the coefficients of the regression model, it is clear that a
high percentage of independent directors does not increase the value of
dividends, even when taking into account the industrial segment and the
period of time under examination. As to the effect of the independent
minority directors, since results are meaningful when the level of trust or
confidence is 95%, a large presence of minority directors does have a
positive impact on dividend distribution, and, thus, on all shareholders.
Then, the regression also known as logit regression (Table 2) verifies
whether the presence of independent minority directors increases the
likelihood of distributing dividends, in terms of amount and frequency,
with a dummy variable (= 1) if the dividend is paid. In particular, the
coefficient is specified in Column 1, while the probability is specified in
Column 2. The dummy variable relating to independent minorityappointed directors shows a remarkable positive correlation between the
138.
139.

See infra Appendix – Table 4.
See Yarram & Dollery, supra note 115, at 268-69, 272 (distinguishing the
empirical impact of CEO duality according to the stewardship theory and the agency
theory).
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probability of payment of dividends and independent minority-appointed
directors in the boardroom.
The robust findings are also evaluated in light of the ownership
structure through the examination of the “close” variable (the percentage
of shares held by large investors in the year of the event). In the absence
of a precise value of the variable above, its mean was calculated over the
2005-2015 time period, so that the average concentration value was
determined for each company, and the value assumed by the central
statistical unit was compared to distribution, thus computing the median.
After estimating the median of the value assumed by the central
statistical units compared to distribution (55.64%), the impact of the
presence of independent minority directors above and below this
threshold was analyzed. The positive effect, assessed in relation to the
fact that they distribute more dividends to minorities, appears more
evident in concentrated ownership, while it is less significant, although
still positive, in widespread ownership structures. 140 All of this data
suggests that list voting makes more sense in the former environment, but
list voting is an indicator–although, not necessarily the best–of agency
costs. When looking at agency costs in both a dispersed ownership system
and a concentrated ownership system, it is evident that, as to the former,
(1) managers retain liquidity, (2) the actual conflict is between managers
and owners, and (3) dividend payouts are really important because paying
out more dividends means less cash for managers to divert. As to the
latter, (1) owners force the company into party transactions to strip capital
from minority owners, (2) the real conflict regards majority versus
minority owners, and (3) dividend payouts matter less than related-party
transactions.
Other relevant legitimate factors must be considered as well, namely:
(1) the frequency of M&A activities, (2) leverage, and (3) the amount of
Research and Development (R&D) and Sales. The results are not
statistically significant, although the regression confirms that all
outcomes are slightly positive in widespread ownership structures.

140. Accounting for fixed effects would sensibly decrease the degrees of freedom to
estimate the regression. In other words, it would (negatively) impact the degrees of
freedom, thus impacting the difference between the number of observations and the
number of variables in the model. Including firm fixed effects would certainly be
preferable for a larger number of companies, but it would not be suitable in the case at
hand.
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As far as M&A activities are concerned, the outcome corroborates
the findings of a recent U.S. study, which references 1,596 acquisitions
between 2009 and 2013, and assesses how board independence, but also
CEO duality and CEO compensation, positively influence the
performance of mergers and acquisitions.141
As to the R&D activity, the result is certainly in line with the agency
and resource dependence theories, which already predict a positive
influence of the “independent director ratio on the financial slack-R&D
investment relationship.”142 Recent literature confirms the existence of a
noticeable effect of sound governance, implicating independent
administrators with regard to investment in innovation and innovation
productivity. This effect can be attributed to a “quasi-natural experiment”
on a sample of over 10,000 observations related to U.S. listed companies
from 1996 to 2009, which included the shock effect of Sarbanes-Oxley.143
R&D/Sales activities are also consistently used as proxies in the literature.
Companies that heavily invest in development and innovation benefit
most from the presence of a staggered board.144 Additionally, the changes
in governance arrangements are considerably more linked to changes in
value for companies with a large customer. 145 With regard to a
geographically different area (in this case, Taiwan), the idea that
141. Emanuele Teti, Alberto Dell’Acqua, Leonardo Etro & Michele Volpe, The
Impact of Board Independency, CEO Duality and CEO Fixed Compensation on M&A
Performance, 17 CORP. GOV: INT’L J. BUS. SOC’Y 947, 947 (2017).
142. A. S. Ashwin, Rishikesha T. Krishnan & Rejie George, Board Characteristics,
Financial Slack and R&D Investments, 46 INT’L STUD. MGMT. & ORG. 8, 8 (2016).
143. Pornsit Jiraporn, Sang Mook Lee, Kuen Jae Park & HakJoon Song, How Do
Independent Directors Influence Innovation Productivity? A Quasi-Natural Experiment,
25 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 435 (2018); see also Donald E. Bowen III, Were NonIndependent Boards Really Captured Before SOX? 4 (July 3, 2017) (on file with author)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2979598 [https://perma.cc/GSL2VMX4] (“greater monitoring should discourage acquisitions with agency conflicts and
opaque R&D, while reduced firm-specific knowledge makes it harder for the board to
evaluate intangible and risky investments like R&D”).
144. K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered
Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 128 (2016).
145. K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and
Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 781-82 (2016)
(defining Large Customer as “at least on customer accounting for 10% or more of [the
company’s] sales”). On the determinants of R&D, see Edwin Mansfield, R&D and
Innovation: Some Empirical Findings, in R&D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 127, 12829 (Zvi Griliches ed., 1984).
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independent choices can affect managerial decisions is confirmed: “firms
competing on innovation through R&D investment may consider giving
considerable weight to the nomination of more independent directors to
the board.”146
Table 1: Effect on the distribution of dividends of the independent
directors taken from the list submitted by majority shareholders
compared to the list presented by minority shareholders.
VARIABLES
DUMMY_
INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS
CASH FLOW
(OPERATIONS
OVER TOTAL
ASSETS)
ROA
CEO DUALITY
NEGATIVE
EARNINGS
INDUSTRY
FIXED EFFECTS
YEAR FIXED
EFFECTS
CONSTANT
Observations
R-squared

(3)
(4)
(1)
(2)
DIVIDEND PAYOUT (on annual sales)
-0.08*

-0.008**

0.026**

0.018*

(-1.86)

(-2.29)

(2.07)

(1.80)

0.033

0.059***

0.022

0.053***

(1.59)
0.001***
(2.86)
-0.011***
(-2.72)

(3.32)
0.001***
(3.31)
-0.006
(-1.57)

(1.24)
0.001***
(2.94)
-0.008**
(-2.09)

(3.01)
0.001***
(3.16)
-0.004
(-1.10)

-0.019***

-0.011***

-0.018***

-0.011***

(-4.69)

(-3.77)

(-4.47)

(-3.81)

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

NO

YES

0.036***
(6.11)
1,260
0.1416

0.052***
(8.08)
1,260
0.2987

0.027***
(5.74)
1,260
0.1798

0.042***
(6.97)
1,260
0.3047

146. Hsiang-Lan Chen, CEO Tenure, Independent Directors and Corporate
Innovation, 3 J. APPLIED FIN. & BANK. 187, 187 (2013).
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Adj. R-squared
0.1382
0.2715
0.1766
0.2778
*** significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 10% level.
Robust z-statistics in parentheses.

Table 2: Results of the logit regression, considering the effect of
independent directors taken from the minority shareholders’ list.
VARIABLES
DUMMY_
MINORITY_
INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS
CASH FLOW
(OPERATIONS OVER
TOTAL ASSETS)
ROA
CEO DUALITY
NEGATIVE
EARNINGS

(1)
(2)
DEP. VAR._DIVIDEND PAYOUT
1.135***

0.239***

(2.86)

(2.89)

4.126*

0.867*

(1.79)
0.157***
(3.93)
-0.749***
(-2.87)

(1.79)
0.033***
(3.85)
-0.157***
(-2.90)

-2.262***

-0.475***

(-7.94)
(-7.83)
INDUSTRY
YES
YES
YEAR
YES
YES
CONSTANT
16.014***
(19.93)
Observations
1,190
1,190
Pseudo r-squared
0.4227
*** significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 10% level.
Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 3: Ownership effect—concentrated versus widespread ownership
structures.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
PAY OUT PAY OUT PAY OUT PAY OUT
Coeff
Coeff
Coeff
Coeff
(t-stat)
(t-stat)
(t-stat)
(t-stat)
LOT_INDEP
-0.003
-0.004
(-0.94)
(-1.56)
LOT_MIN_INDEP
0.024**
0.022***
(2.29)
(2.79)
CFO_TA
0.021
0.050***
0.016
0.041**
(0.96)
(2.63)
(0.79)
(2.22)
ROA
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(2.83)
(3.17)
(3.36)
(2.95)
CEO_PRESIDENT
-0.008*
-0.007*
-0.006
-0.006*
(-1.90)
(-1.86)
(-1.43)
(-1.70)
LOSS
-0.014*** -0.009** -0.012*** -0.008**
(-3.06)
(-2.10)
(-2.61)
(-2.28)
NUMBER_M&A
-0.000
(-0.42)
LEVERAGE
-0.013
(-0.69)
R&D
-0.047
(-1.30)
CONSTANT
0.028*** 0.050*** 0.023*** 0.048***
(6.91)
(10.43)
(4.97)
(11.44)
VARIABLES

INDUSTRY &
NO
YES
NO
YES
YEAR F.E
Observations
690
690
690
690
Adj. R-squared
14.4%
30.3%
18.9%
33.3%
*** significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 10% level.
Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
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VARIABLES

LOT_INDEP

(1)
PAY OUT
Coeff
(t-stat)
-0.015*
(-1.88)

(2)
PAY OUT
Coeff
(t-stat)
-0.011**
(-2.30)

LOT_MIN_IN
DEP

145

(3)
PAY OUT
Coeff
(t-stat)

(4)
PAY OUT
Coeff
(t-stat)

0.027

0.011
(0.97)
0.030
(1.25)
0.001
(1.61)

0.058
(1.28)
0.000*
(1.66)

0.063
(1.52)
0.000
(1.26)

(1.59)
0.034
(1.00)
0.000*
(1.87)

CEO_PRESID
ENT

-0.016***

-0.002

-0.011**

0.003

LOSS

(-2.69)
-0.025***
(-4.87)

(-0.46)
-0.020***
(-3.86)

(-2.18)
-0.026***
(-4.87)

(0.83)
-0.018***
(-4.06)

CFO_TA
ROA

NUMBER_M
&A

0.001
(0.735)
0.045*
(1.80)
0.000
(0.08)

LEVERAGE
R&D

CONSTANT

INDUSTRY
& YEAR F.E

0.045***
(4.60)

0.040***
(5.77)

0.031***
(4.92)

0.014
(1.53)

NO

YES

NO

YES

Observations
570
570
570
570
Adj. R15.0%
32.3%
17.4%
33.3%
squared
*** significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 10% level.
Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
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F. LIST VOTING’S EMPIRICAL LESSON
In light of the literature reviewed above, this research investigates
the impact of independent and minority-appointed directors on the
distribution of dividends. Among the 273 Italian listed corporations in the
period spanning from 2005 to 2015, there were 2,442 directors, 147
including those elected from a minority list, who then moved to the
majority side, or vice versa.148
Overall, the findings partly confirm the starting assumptions.
Contrary to what was predicted, the observations indicate that a
significant number of independent directors in the boardroom (at least
one-third of them) may reduce the dividend payout ratio, suggesting a
negative impact on equity profitability. The study reaffirms the value of
independent minority-appointed directors that, if equal to at least 15% of
the board, affect dividend policies.149
At first glance, readers may be inclined to believe that there is no
need for EI Directors, given the little differences among directors.150 On
closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that independent minority
directors can exert influence on dividend payments and increase the
likelihood of their distributions. The amount, as well as the probability of
their distribution, increases in presence of independent minorityappointed directors, suggesting that data would answer the initial question
positively. This effect is not limited to closely-held ownership structures,
even if it makes more sense in that context.151

147. Among them, 372 have been elected by minority shareholders and 2,070 by
majority shareholders.
148. Without counting these shifts, the total amount of directors would have been
2,311 board members.
149. Results are in line with Hu and Kumar, supra note 112, at 773 (finding that board
independence increases the dividend payout only if it exceeds 40%).
150. Directors appointed by majority shareholders are 57.6 years old (median = 57,
min = 26.5, max = 91) and are part of 1.25 boards on average (median = 1, min = 1, max
= 5), whereas directors appointed by minority shareholders are 57.42 years old (median
= 58, min = 26.5, max = 81) and are part of 1.25 boards on average (median =1, min = 1,
max = 3). The former presents slightly more women (19% v. 14%). The latter are
normally paid a little bit more, which is 61.654 € per year on average (median 45.084,
min = 0, max 160.000) versus 58.117 € per year on average (median = 33.789, min = 0,
max 180.000).
151. Cf. Maribel Sáez & María Gutiérrez, Dividend Policy with Controlling
Shareholders, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107, 127–29 (2015).

2018]

LIST VOTING'S TRAVELS: THE IMPORTANCE
OF BEING INDEPENDENT IN THE BOARDROOM

147

While board characteristics have no influence on the decision to pay
dividends, they have a significant influence on their magnitude.
Directors’ independence, and the subsequent enhancement of effective
board functioning, matters because it permits them to (1) continuously
and effectively monitor corporate performances, requiring from them a
remarkable time commitment and implying a limit on the number of board
seats held; (2) cater to the needs of different investor groups; (3)
determine the best interest of firms to pay dividends, signaling bright
prospects when firms have promising projects in the pipeline; and (4)
encourage firms to pay dividends when they are saddled with high free
cash flow levels. As a result, it would seem that they are more willing to
pay higher dividends, encouraging companies to raise money for future
plans through capital markets. Minority-appointed directors can
complement the role of dividends in the governance of a corporation,
prevent managers from gaining personal benefit, and, at the same time,
build their reputation by paying high dividends.
Interpreting these results, corporate players may come to conclusions
we can offer from profiling the playing patterns of the most empirically
effective contestants in the dividend distribution competition. Investors
may finance firms that pay higher dividends and have more independent
boards as a way to reduce agency cost. Corporations, therefore, may opt
for paying higher dividends and increasing the number of independent
directors in the boardroom to show their quality to the market. The results
could also lead policy makers and regulators to require boards comprised
of EI Directors and recommend that they pursue efficient policies,
encouraging investments and economic growth.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, both de iure condito and de lege ferenda, we may
paraphrase an expression used by the colonists just before the American
Revolution: no participation without representation. Of course,
corporations’ problems cannot be resolved completely by appointing
board members taken from the minority lists–that therefore cannot be
described as a real panacea. Even if the differences among independent
directors taken from the list submitted by the majority or the minority of
shareholders are not that sharp in terms of age, remuneration, gender, or
education, we can, looking at the results, undoubtedly state that list voting
could travel and be effective even beyond Italian borders. This would lead
to positive results in terms of dividend payments.
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Nevertheless, there is a need to determine clear and unambiguous
rules of play which frame the presentation of slates. The regulation needs
to be improved, leading to systematic reflections, and to an open and
constant dialogue, as demonstrated by the “Enriques-Zingales v.
Marchetti-Ventoruzzo” debate. 152 On the one hand, scholars suggest that
a binding re-deliberation of legislation would not only eliminate certain
provisions, such as the inefficient double definition of independence, but
also correct legislative aporias.153 On the other hand, empirical evidence
reinforces the belief that a large number of independent directors could
only be beneficial to the corporation.
In order to evaluate whether the Italian technique can really “travel,”
it would be crucial to also study the findings in the context of widely-held
corporations in the United States, subject to a caveat. We should caution
against drawing “overly strong conclusions from comparative data
alone.” 154 The Italian example preserves its uniqueness, at least with
regard to the technical solution it offers, although the U.S. system is
apparently capable of aligning itself without difficulty with the Italian
approach, which is mindful towards institutional investors, with the
concrete involvement of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII). The
CII, founded in 1985 with the goal of empowering institutional investors
use their proxy power to hold public companies accountable, may play a
similar role to that of Assogestioni.155 Like the Assogestioni, the CII is a
non-profit association that promotes the interests of institutional investors
in the United States and aimed to educate its members, policy makers, and
the public on corporate governance, shareholder rights, and related

152. See generally Enriques & Zingales, supra note 60; Piergaetano Marchetti &
Marco Ventoruzzo, Ecco come si può rafforzare il voto di lista, IL SOLE 24 ORE 1186
(2015) (It.).
153. Maria S. Richter Jr., Appunti Sulla Evoluzione della Disciplina
dell’Amministrazione delle Società Quotate e Sulle sue Prospettive di Riforma’, in ATTI
DEI SEMINARI CELEBRATIVI PER I 40 ANNI DALL’ISTITUZIONE DELLA COMMISSIONE
NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETÀ E LA BORSA, 69, 75-76 (G. Mollo ed., 2015) (It.).
154. Holger Spamann, Empirical Comparative Law, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
131, 148 (2015).
155. About Us-History, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (2018), https://www.
cii.org/cii_history [https://perma.cc/8R9A-SPGN].
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investment issues. By 2015, the CII already supported proxy access in
the United States.156
There is a need for EI Directors. It seems appropriate to call for an
increase in the number of independent directors, particularly in the case
of (although undesirable) larger boards, where the applicable legal
provisions do not appear to be sufficiently protective.

156. Council of Institutional Investors, Proxy Access: Best Practices 2 (2015),
http://www.cii.org/files/publications/misc/08_05_15_Best%20Practices%20-%20Proxy
%20Access.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KY7-XFC2] (describing proxy access as “a
fundamental right of long-term shareowners.”).
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APPENDIX
Table A.1: Distribution of the sampled companies (industry).

Aerospace & Defense
Automobiles & Parts
Banks
Beverages
Chemicals
Construction & Materials
Electricity
Electronic & Electrical Equipment
Financial Services (Sector)
Fixed Line Telecommunications
Food & Drug Retailers
Food Producers
Gas, Water & Multiutilities
General Industrials
General Retailers
Health Care Equipment & Services
Household Goods & Home Construction
Industrial Engineering
Industrial Metals & Mining
Industrial Transportation
Leisure Goods
Media
Mobile Telecommunications
Nonlife Insurance
Oil & Gas Producers
Oil Equipment & Services
Personal Goods
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology
Real Estate Investment & Services
Software & Computer Services
Support Services

Obs.

%

11
73
250
12
21
119
65
73
64
20
15
43
53
39
35
17
60
55
8
10
8
28
10
1
3
7
44
13
7
47
20

0.87
5.79
19.84
0.95
1.67
9.44
5.16
5.79
5.08
1.59
1.19
3.41
4.21
3.1
2.78
1.35
4.76
4.37
0.63
0.79
0.63
2.22
0.79
0.08
0.24
0.56
3.49
1.03
0.56
3.73
1.59
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Technology Hardware & Equipment
Travel & Leisure
Total

151

20
9

1.59
0.71

1.260

100

Table A.2: Distribution of observations in the period 2005-2015
Year

Obs.

%

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

100
102
113
108
107
115
110
130
135
125
115

7.94
8.1
8.97
8.57
8.49
9.13
8.73
10.32
10.71
9.92
9.13

Total

1.260

100

Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
DIVIDEND
PAYOUT
(on annual sales)
DUMMY_
INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS
DUMMY_MIN
ORITY_
INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS
CASH FLOW
(operations over
total assets)

Mean

SD

P5

P25

Median

P75 P95

0.02

0.04

0

0

0.01

0.03 0.09

0.59

0.49

0

0

1

1

1

0.13

0.33

0

0

0

0

1

0.04

0.06 -0.05 0.01

0.04

0.08 0.14
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ROA
1.75
CEO DUALITY
0.41
NEGATIVE
0.28
EARNINGS
# Obs = 1260

6.18 -8.58 0.3
0.49
0.45

0
0

1.62

0
0
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4.55 11.07

0
0

1
1

1
1

Table A.4: Pearson correlation coefficient
DIVIDEN
D

INDEP

PAYOUT

DIRECTO

(on annual

RS

sales)

MINORITY

CASH

_INDEP

FLOW

DIRECTO

(over total

RS

assets)

NEGATIV
ROA

CEO
DUALITY

E
EARNIN
GS

DIVIDEND
PAYOUT
(on annual

1

sales)
DUMMY _
INDEP

-0.1158***

1

0.263***

0.0182

1

0.1797***

-0.0259

0.0545**

1

0.0285

0.5694***

1

0.0562*

0.0249

DIRECTORS
DUMMY_M
INORITY_I
NDEP
DIRECTORS
CASH
FLOW
(over total
assets)
ROA
CEO
DUALITY
NEGATIVE
EARNINGS

0.2684*** -0.0838***

-0.1581*** -0.0726*** -0.1718***

-0.3255*** 0.0861*** -0.0869*** -0.3467***

-0.6194***

1

0.1213***

1

*** significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at 10% level.

